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By Hume’s own account, his most ambitious project, the Treatise on Human Nature, was a 
notoriously immature undertaking, choked with immutable difficulties (Norton (1993, p. 349)). 
Perhaps as a result of this immaturity, and perhaps because, as Kant suggests above, Hume is 
perpetually misread, his view on objects remains obscured. What are they? Are they ideas? 
Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? To date, scholars have not 
provided a unified, much less exhaustive, answer to these questions. Rather, four somewhat 
fragmented interpretations have been circulating in the literature. We may characterize them (in 
partial response to Grene (1994)) as follows: 1.) The phenomenonalist reading, where objects are 
impressions (e.g. Grene (1994), Bennett (1971), Steinberg (1981) and Dicker (2007)). 2.) The 
intentional reading, where objects are the objects of thought (e.g. Salmon (1983)). 3.) The realist 
reading, where objects are mind-independent things (e.g. Wilson (1989), Flage (1990), Costa 
(1989), G. Strawson (2007), Wright (2007). 4.) The imagined, but non-causal reading, where 
objects, to varying degrees (depending on the scholar at hand) are imagined, but are not imagined 
as causes (e.g. Price (1940), Kemp Smith (1941) Wilbanks (1968) and Waxman (1994)).  
This book presents a new interpretation of Humean objects, where I focus on just Book I 
of the Treatise. In the course of doing so, I show that although in places, Hume surely does suggest 
that objects are impressions, or are intentional, or are imagined but are not imagined as causes, 
these intermittent uses of the word ‘object’ do not reflect Hume’s more comprehensive position. 
Nor does Hume think that objects are mind independent things; he is not a realist.  
Rather, throughout Book I of the Treatise, Hume struggled with two positions on the nature 
of objects. On the one hand, Hume believed that despite what we, in our common, i.e. “vulgar” 
state of mind, or alternatively, in our more sophisticated “philosophical” state of mind, think that 
objects are, what we actually and always do, is imagine that objects are the causes of our various 
and interrupted perceptions. Objects are nothing more than complex, imagined ideas, as such, they 
are perceptions. Moreover, objects are necessarily imagined (as causes) because they constitute 
certain conditions of possibility for experience, making them functions of what we may refer to as 
a “transcendental” faculty of the imagination: “we always imagine that there is some cause that 
separates or unites [objects]” (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 74; emphasis added). In this very general respect, 
Hume anticipates the Kantian transcendental turn. 
But Hume also seemed to think that we only imagine causes (although unwittingly) when 
we reach a certain “philosophical” level of thought. Thus, when we imagine a cause of a set of 
interrupted and varying perceptions—where we believe that this cause is a real mind-independent 
thing—we are “philosophers,” as they are described at the end of 1.4.2 (“Of skepticism with regard 
to the senses”). However, such philosophers are not aware that they are imagining causes. Instead, 
they mistakenly think that they are using reason to conclude that objects are real, mind-
independent things. As a result, on this second reading, imagining causes is a natural, although 
unacknowledged, culmination of human thought, as opposed to being something that all of us, 
always—although unknowingly—do. 
The tension between these two positions on objects manifests itself in Hume’s much 
discussed account of personal identity, presented in 1.4.6 of the Treatise. In fact, Hume openly 
acknowledges this tension in the Appendix to the Treatise. Here, he suggests that the philosophical 
account of perfect identity is mistaken, while his account of transcendentally conceived of perfect 
identity is correct—at least in regard to the “self.” However, this is not a definitive solution to the 
conflict. In fact, this conflict is never resolved in the Treatise (nor anywhere else in Hume’s work). 
Regardless of this rift in his thought, it may be shown that Hume thought that some objects 
are imagined to be causes in a manner that is more “justified” than others. Generally speaking, this 
justification turns on how empirically grounded the given imagined cause is in sense impressions. 
This “grounding” occurs much in the same way that Hume thinks we come up with an idea of an 
abstract, general idea. A particular object is imagined as the cause of a set of resembling 
impressions and/or ideas that exactly represent impressions. This imagined cause indirectly 
represents one of those impressions, making it “real”—in a manner to be explained in great detail 
in this book. Accordingly, Hume writes off the “antient” (T 1.4.3) and “modern” (T 1.4.4) 
conceptions of objects, as well as notions of “immaterial souls” (T 1.4.5) as unjustified. These 
philosophical “objects” are perverted cases of imagining causes; their “objects” do not represent 
(indirectly or not) any impression and/or any idea that exactly represents an impression, and thus, 
they are completely incomprehensible. Meanwhile, the “philosophical” position presented at the 
end of 1.4.2 may be interpreted as the generic, justified version of imagining causes. 
In the course of showing that some ideas of particular objects are justified, we see that 
some causal inferences are justified. This justification is a function of the constancy and coherence 
that obtains of our impressions, and ideas that exactly represent our impressions. As such, justified 
causal relations reflect “reality” much in the same way that justified ideas of particular objects 
reflect reality. Relatedly, we see that Hume must interpreted as an “agnostic’ in regard to the mind-
independent existence of objects and causality, contrary to the recent tendency to interpret Hume 
as a “skeptical realist.”   
In the course of this analysis, we review seven kinds of belief at work in the Treatise, five 
kinds of reason, three kinds of causation, Hume’s two systems of reality, and two fundamental 
kinds of objects, i.e. those that may be identified with impressions and ideas that exactly represent 
impressions, and those that admit of what Hume refers to as a “perfect identity.” 
